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Abstract 
Large and growing international financial linkages between East and West have altered 
the nature of the stability risks faced by European banking systems, increasing susceptibility 
to contagion. This paper aims to identify potential risks of cross-border contagion using a 
sample of large Western and Eastern European banks. We assume that contagion risk is 
associated with extreme co-movements in a market-based measure of bank soundness, 
controlling for common underlying factors. We also find evidence that contagion risk across 
European banks heightened significantly during the recent crisis. Contagion among Western 
European banks with the highest market share in Eastern Europe and from this group to 
Eastern European banks shows the largest increase in our sample. We find also evidence of 
contagion spreading from Eastern European banks, but this effect seems to reflect a broader 
phenomenon of contagion from emerging markets to banks in advanced countries exposed to 
these markets. Finally, our findings offer only mixed evidence of the existence of a direct 
ownership channel in the transmission of contagion.  
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* Bank of Italy, International Economic Analysis and Relations Department.    1 Introduction1
With the signi￿cant increase in foreign banks presence in Eastern Europe (EE),2 inter-
linkages among Western and Eastern European banking systems have grown markedly.
The entry of foreign intermediaries has brought important gains in terms of e¢ ciency and
diversi￿cation and, through increased access to cross-border ￿nancing, it has contributed
to rapid ￿nancial deepening in EE. At the same time, large and growing international
￿nancial linkages have altered the nature of the stability risks faced by ￿nancial systems,
raising susceptibility to contagion. Higher integration by EE countries into the broader
European banking system and the strong presence of foreign players have increased host
countries￿vulnerability to idiosyncratic shocks from abroad. Conversely, the increased im-
portance of EE in large Western European banking groups￿portfolios has also heightened
the risk of contagion for home countries. The recent global ￿nancial crisis has brought to
the fore the risks associated with ￿nancial interconnectedness and the potential transmis-
sion of shocks across intermediaries, and banks with operations in EE have not escaped
unscathed from occasional bouts of heightened volatility.3
The purpose of this paper is to identify the potential risks of cross-border contagion
among the banking sectors of Western and Eastern European countries, using information
captured in banks￿stock prices. Information from security prices helps to counter data
limitations and imperfect knowledge about indirect exposures across ￿nancial institutions,
connected, for example, to the use of similar investment strategies. As a market-based
measure of bank distress we use the distance to default, which combines information from
equity prices and banks￿balance sheets.
We use a dataset of daily distance to default of 33 European listed banks. Our data
sample comprises: most of the largest banks operating in Eastern Europe; the Western
European banking groups which, through their branches and subsidiaries, own the highest
market share in the EE banking systems; the remaining largest, and globally systemic,
European banking groups.
We de￿ne contagion risk as the risk of one bank being in distress conditional on one
or more other banks being in distress, controlling for common shocks a⁄ecting all banks
symmetrically and simultaneously. To investigate contagion, we focus on the behaviour of
the left tail of the distribution of the changes in the distance to default (i.e. the lowest
15% quantile) and, using a logistic regression, we estimate how the probability of one
bank experiencing an extreme negative change in the distance to default is related to the
occurrence of negative tail events in other banks in the sample and to country-speci￿c and
global factors.
The approach applied in this paper builds on a recent body of literature which uses
a similar methodology to estimate cross-border contagion (Chan-Lau et al., 2007, ￿ CihÆk
1We would like to thank Mardi Dungey, Massimo Sbracia, Demosthenes Tambakis, Melvyn Weeks
and two anonymous referees for their helpful comments. Part of the work was carried out while Paolo
was visiting the University of Cambridge. The views expressed in this paper are those of the au-
thors and do not necessarily re￿ ect those of the Bank of Italy. Email: emidio.cocozza@bancaditalia.it;
paolo.piselli@bancaditalia.it.
2In the paper "EE" refers to the new EU member states of Central and Eastern Europe (excluding
Slovenia), along with Croatia, Russia, Serbia and Ukraine.
3An example is o⁄ered by the events following the rating agency Moody￿ s release, in mid-February
2009, of a report titled "Western European ownership of East European banks during ￿nancial and macro-
economic stress", warning that it might downgrade banks active in Eastern Europe owing to their heavy
exposure to the region and the region￿ s rapidly deteriorating macroeconomic environment. The report
shocked investor con￿dence, leading to a sharp drop in banks￿equity prices and a steep increase in parent
banks￿CDS premiums.
5and Ong, 2007, Gropp et al., 2010). We extend previous research on the transmission of
shocks among banks and banking systems in the following directions:
1) We test for contagion risk among banks in EE and the largest Western European
banking groups, some of which operate in Eastern Europe. To our knowledge, this is the
￿rst comprehensive attempt to measure contagion among banking systems in the two
regions.
2) We provide new evidence of how contagion risks in European banking systems
evolved in the recent global ￿nancial crisis (i.e. after the summer of 2007).4
3) We introduce a test to evaluate whether changes in contagion e⁄ects across time
and regions are signi￿cant.
4) To control for broader contagion from emerging markets, we carry out a counterfac-
tual experiment, comparing our model￿ s results to those obtained substituting a sample
of Latin American banks for the Eastern European one.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next Section describes various
potential sources of contagion between Western and Eastern European banking systems.
Sections 3 and 4 discuss the methodology and the input data. Section 5 shows estimation
results and discusses some issues related to the robustness of our ￿ndings. Finally, Section
6 concludes the paper.
2 Potential sources of contagion between Western and East-
ern European banking systems
The literature on ￿nancial contagion has devised several avenues through which idiosyn-
cratic shocks a⁄ecting one bank may spread to other banks or banking sectors. Contagious
bank failures may result either from direct linkages connecting banks or from informational
externalities (for a survey of the theoretical literature see Moheeput, 2008, and Allen et
al., 2009).5
Direct linkages may take the form of contractual arrangements, such as the cross-
holding of deposits or loans in the interbank market. Interbank exposures may create
problems if aggregate liquidity provision is insu¢ cient and banks try to avoid liquidation
of their long-term assets by liquidating their claims on other banks (possibly in other
regions). A ￿nancial crisis in one region could then spread by contagion to other regions
and thereby introduce liquidity problems in the latter. Interdependence is thus bene￿cial in
tranquil periods, as the interbank market provides the channel for cross-regional insurance
against liquidity shocks, but in turbulent periods interlinkages in the interbank market
provide the main conduit that spreads a crisis from bank to bank (Allen and Gale, 2000).
Direct linkages may also take less explicit forms, such as those arising from payment and
settlement infrastructures, asset prices or common investors.
Informational spillovers as a result of market expectations represent a second potential
channel for contagion. For example, if banks￿fundamentals are believed to be correlated,
bad news about one bank may lead investors in another bank to change their perception
of its soundness. This may be the case of banks sharing similar business and geographic
strategies or operating in the same region. In Acharya and Yorulmazer (2008) the return to
bank loans has two components, a systematic component and an idiosyncratic component,
and depositors can only observe the overall realisation of bank loan returns, but not the
4Lucey and ￿evic (2010) carry out a similar analysis but only up to October 2008.
5Empirical research in this ￿eld largely focuses on testing for the existence of contagion and to a lesser
extent on estimating the di⁄erent channels through which shocks propagate. Dungey et al. (2005a) provide
a review of alternative methods to test for contagion.
6actual breakdown. Hence, one bank￿ s poor performance spills over into other banks￿
borrowing costs.
Since the beginning of the decade banking systems in EE have been closely integrating
with the rest of Europe. Currently, most EE economies are highly dependent on West-
ern European banks, either directly, via cross-border credit extended by headquarters to
bank and non-bank residents in the region, or through the activity of local branches and
subsidiaries. According to BIS data, at end-2008 outstanding consolidated foreign claims
(cross-border claims and local claims of foreign a¢ liates) on non-banks were equivalent,
on average, to about 42 per cent of total cross-border and domestic credit to non-banks
in EE, even though the magnitude of the exposure varied signi￿cantly across countries.
Austria, Germany, and Italy accounted for the largest share of foreign claims on the re-
gion as a whole, with the notable exception of the Baltics, where claims were mainly held
by Swedish banks. A few EE economies had relatively more diversi￿ed sources of funds
(Table 1).
The high exposure of EE banking systems re￿ ects the strong presence of foreign in-
termediaries in domestic markets, as the share of foreign-owned banks accounts for the
bulk of the banking system assets in many countries. Moreover, given the high degree
of foreign ownership, and the relatively undeveloped state of domestic capital markets,
banks in EE have been increasingly relying on external funding sources to ￿nance their
operations (mostly syndicated loans or parent support). On average, cross-border claims
on banks in EE were equivalent to 17 per cent of total banking liabilities at the end of
2008, but for some countries foreign funding played a bigger role, in particular in the
Baltics, in Romania and, to a lesser extent, in Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary and Slovakia.
For EE subsidiaries the importance of funding in the wholesale international interbank
markets is generally small if compared to parent-bank ￿nancing and syndicated lending,
since the latter source of funding is more expensive for the subsidiary, given the risk
premiums and counterparty risks. Therefore, the wholesale interbank market does not
seem to be a major channel of cross-border contagion in the case of EE banks, even
though it may be not negligible in some banking systems, for instance in Russia (`rvai et
al., 2009).
Banking systems that are heavily dependent on foreign funding may face a shortfall
of funds, or more costly access to them, in the case of a sudden reassessment of exposure
to the host country due to concerns about vulnerabilities in that country or in the region.
Moreover, while reputational risks and long-term business strategy may make it unlikely
for parent banks to withhold support of their a¢ liates, the degree of their support depends
on funding conditions in home markets, and may be limited if these conditions have become
strained.
Problems in a host country may also result in liquidity or solvency pressures for the
home countrys￿banking system, provided that the exposure to the former is substantial.
The magnitude of foreign exposure of Western European banking systems to EE is on
average contained. The share of claims on EE was about 4 per cent of total banking
assets in home countries at end-2008. This share was higher for Austria, Sweden and
Belgium, while the other countries were less exposed. However, aggregate country-level
data may blur relevant linkages across individual banks. In fact, a relatively small set
of Western European banking groups have been taking advantage of the high growth
potential o⁄ered by EE markets, developing a multiple-country presence in the region
and acquiring signi￿cant market shares in a number of countries (Table 2). For some of
these groups, operations in EE account for a substantial share of their pro￿ts as well as
of their assets, implying that they could be negatively a⁄ected by adverse developments
7in this region (Figure 1). As these groups have, in some cases, systemic importance in
Western European markets and, at the same time, are exposed to several EE countries, a
shock a⁄ecting one EE country may spread in many directions through these institutions.
Indeed, the concentration of the business among a few large and niche players may have an
ambivalent e⁄ect on ￿nancial stability, as the failure of one particular market participant
may a⁄ect others severely. It not only may impose losses on other institutions, but it
can also create doubts about the health of other institutions. In order to analyse these
potential sources of contagion, our research relies on a bank-to-bank approach, di⁄erently
from other empirical papers (e.g. Van Rijckeghem and Weder, 2001).
3 Methodology
3.1 Measure of default risk
In the literature a number of di⁄erent indicators have been proposed for estimating default
probabilities on the basis of the prices of ￿nancial instruments. The measure of a bank￿ s
default risk used here is the distance to default (DD), which represents the number of
standard deviations separating the bank￿ s asset value from the book value of its liabilities
(Crosbie and Bohn, 2003).6 A greater DD is associated with a lower probability of distress.
Gropp et al.(2006) argue that the DD is a complete and unbiased indicator of bank fragility
(from a supervisory perspective), as it combines information about the market value of
assets, earnings expectations, and leverage and volatility of assets, thus encompassing the
most important determinants of bank default risk.7
The derivation of the DD is described in detail in Gropp et al.(2010) and in Chan Lau
et al.(2007). The DD measure is based on the structural valuation model of Black and
Scholes (1973) and Merton (1974). As equity holders are residual claimants in the ￿rm
since they only get paid after creditors, equity can be expressed as a call option with a
strike price equal to the face value of debt D and maturity T. At expiration, the value of
equity, ET, is given by:
ET = max(AT ￿ DT;0)
where AT is the asset value of the ￿rm at expiration.
Given the standard assumptions underlying the derivation of the Black-Scholes option















where r is the risk-free rate and ￿A is the asset volatility. Default occurs when the
value of the ￿rm￿ s assets is less than the strike price, that is, when the ratio of the value
6A widely used measure of a bank￿ s distress risk, the probability of default derived from Credit Default
Swaps (CDS) spreads, was not considered as CDS are not available for most of the Eastern European banks
included in our sample. To our knowledge, however, there is no clear evidence in the literature to suggest
the most appropriate method to derive PoDs (for a general discussion see Goodhart and Segoviano, 2009),
and during the recent ￿nancial crisis di⁄erent types of PoDs have not produced uniform results for large
banks (Singh and Youssef, 2010).
7They show that the distance to default is a good predictor of banks￿rating downgrades in developed
countries, even though its predictive performance is poorer when closer to default. Chan-Lau et al. (2004)
￿nd analogous evidence in emerging market countries.
8of assets to debt is less than one. The DD is essentially the number of standard deviations
in the ￿rm￿ s value from the default point.
Calculating DD requires knowing both the asset value and the asset volatility. The
required values, however, correspond to the economic values rather than the accounting
￿gures. In practice asset value and volatility are not observable and must be estimated
with a system of simultaneous equations,8 using the observable market value of equity
capital and the equity price return volatility.9
As we are interested in the transmission of shocks from one bank to another, we use
the percentage changes in the DD. In the spirit of "extreme value theory", to investigate
contagion we focus on the behaviour of the left tail of the distribution of the changes in
the distance to default, rather than examining statistical interdependence for the entire
distribution.10 As the transmission process of shocks across banks may be non-linear,
looking at interdependencies in the tails of the distribution allows the examination of
these non-linearities, as well as a relaxation of the assumption of multivariate normality,
which tend to be violated in the case of fat-tailed ￿nancial market data (De Bandt and
Hartmann, 2001; Straetmans, 2000).11
To take into account only lasting shocks and to reduce the noise in the data, we
calculate the weekly (5 trading-day) changes in the DD (￿DD), on a daily basis.
We identify extreme values, or large negative shocks (exceedances), as the 15th per-
centile left tail of the common distribution of the ￿DDs across all banks in each sub-




1 if ￿DD ￿ T15
0 otherwise
￿
8To obtain the daily time series of DD for each bank, we have to use a non-linear system, which also
implies the computation of the cumulative normal distribution. We approximated the normal distribution
with a high-order polynomial, following Gapen et al. (2008), and we implemented a routine in MATLAB
to solve the non-linear equations.
9The value of equity capital corresponds to the market capitalization of the ￿rm, equity volatility
corresponds to historical equity volatility. In our case, we drew from Datastream and Bloomberg the
daily market value for each bank starting from 1 January 2002 and we computed 1-year historical equity
volatility as ￿E =
p
252￿￿d;where ￿d is the standard deviation of daily returns in the previous year, to
reduce noise. The last parameter, the value of liabilities, D, is assumed to be equal to the face value of
total liabilities and the time horizon T is ￿xed at one year. We calculate D from yearly balance-sheet
data; then we interpolate them linearly in order to get a daily estimate. As an alternative, in the literature
D is sometimes assumed to be equal to the face value of short-term liabilities plus half the face value of
long-term liabilities.
10Interdependencies of ￿nancial returns have been traditionally modelled based on correlation analysis.
However, correlation is a measure of dependence in the centre of the distribution, which gives little weight
to tail events when evaluated empirically. Since distress is characterized as a tail event, correlation may
not be an appropriate measure of distress dependence when marginal distributions of ￿nancial assets are
non-normal (Goodhart and Segoviano, 2009).
11Gropp and Moerman (2004) show that not only does the distribution of precentage changes of the DD
of individual banks display fat tails, but also that the correlation among banks is substantially higher for
larger shocks. Bae, Karolyi, and Stulz (2003) do the same for emerging-market stock returns. Both papers
suggest that it is necessary to examine the tails of the distribution separately from the overall distribution.
12The same threshold is used in Duggar and Mitra (2007). Ideally, a 10
th or even 5
th percentile left
tail would capture the very extreme events; however, either cut-o⁄ would have resulted in far too few
observations for estimations in the second part of this paper, when we consider a shorter time span to
study the e⁄ect of crisis on the contagion mechanism. We have checked that our estimates are robust
to the choice of a lower threshold; Tables 13 and 14 show that considering only the 10
th percentile left
tail, di⁄erences from the baseline are in general not statistically signi￿cant, with the notable exception of
contagion among EE banks.
9where T15 is the 15th percentile threshold in the left tail of the distribution.
3.2 Empirical model
In order to identify contagion e⁄ects and the direction of contagion from one bank to
others, we employ a binomial logit, following Chan-Lau, Mitra and Ong (2007).
More speci￿cally, we estimate the probability that bank y will be in distress at time t
conditional on other banks xi(x 6= y) being in distress at time t ￿ 1, after controlling for
other country-speci￿c and global factors zj. For each bank, we run the following regression:



















The parameters ￿ represents the sensitivity of bank y to extreme shocks (exceedances)
experienced by the same bank in the previous periods (up to 5 lags13); ￿ represents the
sensitivity of bank y to extreme shocks experienced by the rest of the banks in the sample
during the previous period (xi 6= y) or in other words, the co-exceedance of shocks to bank
y with shocks to other banks in the sample;14 ￿ represents the sensitivity of bank y to
"common shocks" zi, i.e. ￿nancial developments in its own country as well as in global
markets. All control variables are also transformed in binary 1/0 variables (following a
similar procedure used for the ￿DDs) so that only extreme common shocks are identi￿ed
(see, for instance, Boyson et al., 2010). Control variables are considered exogenous and
therefore included at time t:15
3.3 Mapping risk and testing for cross-border contagion
Starting from a bank-to-bank perspective, we try to map risks that individual bank failures
turn into a chain of failures across European banking systems. In particular, we are
interested in measuring di⁄erences in the intensity and direction of contagion, depending
on the source of shocks, the banks a⁄ected and the period considered. For this reason, we
opt for a time series approach rather than a panel one. A panel analysis, carried out in a few
papers (Van Rijckeghem and Weder, 2000, Baur and Fry, 2006 and 2009), has the notable
advantage of better accounting for common factors underlying shock transmissions, but,
on the other hand, it only provides evidence of the average contagion within the sample.
We carry out separate logistic regressions for each single bank in the sample and
for each period. Then, we summarize our results to measure contagion among di⁄erent
13We include ￿ve lags of the dependent variable in order to control for any autocorrelation in the residuals
that may be induced by the use of overlapping weekly changes in the DD.
14As only one lag co-exceedances are included, we may miss those cases of contagion taking place within
one day that would occur if ￿nancial markets are e¢ cient and incorporate information very quickly (Gropp
et al., 2006). On the other hand, potential simultaneity biases arising from the presence of endogenous
variables suggest the use of lagged variables. As shown in Pesaran and Pick (2007), using contemporaneous
regressors in this kind of model is likely to bias the measure of contagion upward. To make sure that lagged
variables are actually predetermined (exogenous), we test for autocorrelation in the residuals. Q-statistics
at lag 1 and up to lag 5 (Ljung-Box, 1979) reject autocorrelation in most cases, with a few exceptions in
some equations estimated in the crisis period (the shorter time span).
15Details on data and sources can be found in Section 4.
10subsets of banks, collecting the signi￿cant (positive) coe¢ cients in individual regressions
and grouping them by each subset.16
As the maximum number of signi￿cant coe¢ cients depends on the number of banks in
each subset, we measure contagion as the percentage of positive and signi￿cant coe¢ cients
￿+
i out of all coe¢ cients (regressors) ￿i in the subset, that is, positive signi￿cant contagion
e⁄ects are expressed as a percentage of all possible bank contagion e⁄ects, where possible





Finally, in order to compare di⁄erences in contagion e⁄ects both across subsets and
over time, we carry out a speci￿c test for these percentages. The signi￿cance of a vari-
able in a regression can be considered a dichotomous Bernoulli random variable (yes/no).
The number (sum) of signi￿cant e⁄ects or their proportion, assuming that each variable
is independent and identically distributed, is then a binomial distribution.17 Assuming
independence between two random variables, a commonly used statistic for testing the
di⁄erence of proportions is given by Z =
p1￿p2
V (p1￿p2), where V (p1 ￿ p2) is the estimated
variance of the di⁄erence V (p1 ￿ p2) = p1(1￿ p1)=n1 + p2(1￿ p2)=n2:
Although this distribution is no longer binomial, we can reasonably use the normal
approximation, which is acceptable for n large enough and p far from zero.18 Equipped
with this simple tool, we can test the signi￿cance of contagion among groups of banks and
evaluate the di⁄erences over time, before and during the crisis.19
We also carried out McNemar￿ s test, a testing procedure used when the two proportions
p1 and p2 are correlated (Sheskin, 2007). As expected, all our results are con￿rmed with
a higher probability.20
4 Data and descriptive statistics
Our sample is composed of 33 listed European banks. The number of banks included in
the sample is the result of a selection based on the need to keep the time span su¢ ciently
long and, at the same time, to include most of the largest banks operating in EE.21 The
16This is basically a meta-analysis approach, which aims at measuring the e⁄ect of a variable on another
within a speci￿c model/relationship by collecting results from di⁄erent studies (in our case estimates) and
testing for the signi￿cance of their overall e⁄ect, generally comparing the mean of an experimental group
to that of a control group. See for instance Rosenthal (1991).
17Let x1 be the number of signi￿cant co-exceedances and n1 the number of regressors in the ￿rst group
of banks. Then p1 =
x1
n1; the proportion of signi￿cant co-exceedances, has a binomial distribution with
mean p1 and variance p1(1￿ p1): Similarly, the proportion of the signi￿cant co-exceedances in a second
group of regressions has a binomial distribution with mean p2 and variance p2(1￿ p2):
18A simple rule of thumb is np and n(1-p) > 5, a condition met in our case. See for instance Sheskin
(2007).
19We are assuming that signi￿cant coe¢ cients are mutually independent from each other. This cannot
be the case, however, because coe¢ cients come from regressions which have common regressors. This
hypothesis is not restrictive, though, as the test in the case of dependent samples would be more powerful
at detecting a signi￿cant di⁄erence in the samples (alternative hypothesis). Hence, our approach can be
seen as conservative towards the null hypothesis of no di⁄erence in the samples.
20This test is feasible when the two samples are made up of the same units and so we applied it to
di⁄erences over time. It cannot be used for cross-group comparisons.
21As highlighted by Chan Lau et al. (2007), including smaller-non systemic banks could have the e⁄ect
of overestimating the impact of certain banking systems on others.
11data sample is divided into three subsets. The ￿rst one (EEB) is composed of the largest
Eastern European banks listed on a stock exchange and with available stock prices data
from January 2003 to March 2009 (Table 3). According to these criteria, we have left
out all banks in Serbia and Ukraine (as stock prices data are available only since 2006),
Estonia (as there are no listed banks) and Latvia (as these banks were at the lower end
of the size ranking). The sub-sample of EE banks is composed of 15 banks, including the
two largest independent groups in the region (Sberbank and OTP) and 10 subsidiaries of
banking groups with headquarters in advanced economies, 5 of which are included in our
sample of Western European groups. The other two sub-samples (Table 4) are made up of
the 9 Western European banking groups with the highest market shares in the EE banking
system (SWG), provided they are listed in a stock exchange over the entire period under
analysis, and the 9 remaining largest European banking groups (OWG).
In order to control for shocks a⁄ecting the local economy and global markets, we
use four variables, drawing on the existing literature on ￿nancial crisis and contagion.
We include the local stock market weekly returns to control for country-speci￿c market
shocks, the MSCI world price index weekly returns to control for global market shocks, the
weekly percentage changes in the implied volatility index (VIX), reported by the Chicago
Board Options Exchange, as a proxy of shocks to investors￿risk appetite, and the weekly
percentage changes in spreads between the three-month U.S. Treasury Bill interest rate and
the three-month LIBOR (TED spread), as a proxy for shocks to global funding conditions.
In the regressions, control variables are considered exogenous and are included at time t;
except for the VIX, which is lagged by one period, to take into account the di⁄erence in
trading hours between the US and Europe.
After computing banks￿DD, we derive the percentage changes in DD and identify
extreme negative values in the ￿DDs of individual banks across the sample in two periods,
de￿ned as January 1, 2003-July 31, 2007 (calm period) and as August 1, 2007-March 31,
2009, the latter starting with the global liquidity squeeze associated with the pressure in
the U.S subprime market and dubbed the crisis period.22
Figure 2 presents the distribution of ￿DDs (we have 39,435 observations in the ￿rst
period and 14,355 in the second period) and the 15th percentile left tail. As expected, the
distribution is not normal, with fat tails which include few extreme values. Moreover, in
the crisis period there is a shift of the distribution to the left.
Figure 3 shows the number of banks experiencing an extreme negative shock at time
t, that is the number of exceedances at each date. Looking at the histograms, it is quite
evident that tail events in the ￿rst sub-period are more evenly spread, while in the crisis
period they are mostly concentrated in three episodes, and in particular after the collapse
of Lehman Brother in September 2008.
By construction, exceedances occur in 15% of all observations in each sub-period. For
each subset of banks, however, the frequency of exceedances may di⁄er. In the ￿rst period,
exceedances are relatively more frequent among EE banks than among SWGs and OWGs
(respectively, 18%, 13% and 12% of all observations in each group). This pattern reversed
during the crisis, with a prevalence of exceedances among SWGs and OWGs compared to
EE banks (20%, 18% and 10%, respectively).
These ￿gures are useful to shed some light on how the frequencies of exceedances
evolve, given the occurrence of at least one shock (i.e. an exceedance) in our sample in the
previous period. In particular, if there were not contagion, these frequencies should not
22The end of March 2009 is generally considered the turning point of the crisis in ￿nancial markets.
In particular ￿nancial markets in emerging market countries bounced back quite quickly from the lowest
levels after that time.
12be a⁄ected by the presence of shocks that occurred in the previous period. The ijth entry
of Table 5b shows the (conditional) probability of observing at least one shock to a bank
in group j in column at time t, given that at least one shock has occurred in a bank in
group i in row at time t ￿ 1:23 In both periods, conditional probabilities are much higher
than unconditional ones, indicating that shocks tend to spread across banks and regional
boundaries. Moreover, shocks seem to be persistent: the probability of a shock continuing
much higher than the probability of observing shocks on two consecutive periods if these
were independent. For example, in the calm period the empirical probability that a shock
in SWGs continues is 23%, which is more than 10 times as large as the probability of two
consecutive shocks in the same group (0.13*0.13=1.69%). Finally, conditional probabilities
in the crisis period are higher and in some case more than double compared with the calm
period, with the notable exception of shocks to EEBs, which remain broadly unchanged
in the two periods.24
The fact that the probability of a shock tends to increase following a previous shock in
another bank indicates that shocks disseminate and may bring about more severe e⁄ects
over time. However, this preliminary analysis may overestimate contagion, as exceedances
could be the result of common shocks a⁄ecting several banks at once (such as deteriorating
liquidity conditions, shifts in investors￿risk aversion, etc.) and for which we do not control.
In addition, probabilities are conditioned on a group of banks at a time, thus assuming
independence from the third group of banks left out. Finally, for each group of banks,
exceedances are summed over time and across banks, neglecting the fact that they are
linked over time by their coming from di⁄erent time series, one for each bank. We take
into account all these aspects by modelling probability of contagion in a logit model.
5 Estimation results
As stated above, we run 33 regressions in each period. From each equation we collect the
signi￿cant (positive) coe¢ cients, out of all 1,056 coe¢ cients, and we tabulate them by
sub-sample of banks and sub-period in Table 6 (baseline model).25
In the calm period (left-hand side of Table 6), there is some evidence of contagion
among all three groups of banks.26 This matches with the preliminary evidence we have
drawn from the analysis of the transition matrix, where the transmission of extreme neg-
ative shocks across banks is not negligible even in the calm period. Moreover, considering
the sample as a whole, no subset of banks stands out as a source of contagion, as shown
by the percentages in the last column (All banks).
Looking at evidence of contagion for SWGs, it does not appear to be a speci￿c source of
contagion from both EEB and SWG groups, respectively, due to linkages between the two
groups or similar geographic investment strategies. This result seems to be at odds with
the strong presence in EE of the specialized banking groups in our sample. A possible
explanation is that, at the beginning of the time span considered in our analysis, the
23This kind of analysis goes back to Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000). See Markwat et al. (2009) for
details.
24Symmetrically, we construct the transition matrix of shocks at time t under the circumstance of absence
of shocks at time t ￿ 1 (Table 5a). As expected, in both sub-periods shock probabilities are much lower
than in the presence of shocks in the previous period, and in most cases are lower than unconditional
probabilities.
25As only positive coe¢ cients are considered, we use one-side t-test at 5% signi￿cance level. Standard
errors are Huber/White robust. Regressions are available upon request.
26Percentages of co-exceedances are all di⁄erent from zero at conventional levels (results available upon
request).
13weight of EE in SWGs￿strategies was fairly modest. More importantly, the calm period
was largely characterized by very strong economic growth in EE countries, and banks
operating there made sizable pro￿ts without carrying any relevant risk.
By contrast the other sub-sample of large European banks (OWGs) shows a relatively
high level of contagion coming from banks within the same subset.
EEBs look relatively prone to contagion only from the same group.
Summing up, before the crisis contagion risk appears to be concentrated mainly among
the largest Western European banking groups.27 In the period of eased ￿nancial conditions
and solid economic growth up to the summer of 2007, spillovers across banking systems in
Western and Eastern Europe were contained. In particular, groups investing in EE were
less a⁄ected by risks in their operation in the region, possibly as, owing to the stable and
high returns realized in these banking markets, the market reaction to negative news was
more subdued.28
This pattern, however, changed following the eruption of the international ￿nancial
crisis.
Our results for the crisis period are summarized in the right-hand side of Table 6. In
addition, in Table 8 we show the results of a test of the signi￿cance of the di⁄erences in
contagion risks between the crisis and the calm periods.
The main results are summed up below.
Overall, there is a more than twofold increase in contagion risk in our sample compared
to the calm period (from 9.8 to 20.9% of signi￿cant co-exceedances on average). Contagion
e⁄ects rise for all bank groups, within each subset and between each pair of subsets. The
only exception is the risk of contagion within OWGs, which is lower in the crisis period
compared with the calm period, even though the di⁄erence is not statistically signi￿cant.29
During the crisis, contagion among SWGs, and from SWGs to EEBs, tripled. Also
contagion among EEBs and from EEBs to SWGs increased notably. Therefore, after
global ￿nancial conditions changed in 2007, uncertainties about the risk of operations in
EE and their adverse impact on banks￿soundness seem to have contributed to deeper stress
in SWGs. At the same time, SWGs coming under increasing pressure from the global
￿nancial turmoil have heightened market participants￿ concerns about regional banks￿
shock-absorption capacities.
Our ￿ndings o⁄er only mixed evidence on the existence of a direct ownership channel.
In the crisis period, the percentage of signi￿cant coe¢ cients relative to subsidiaries in
parent banks￿regressions is 25% and it is not statistically di⁄erent from the overall average
for SWGs. On the other hand, about 40% of all coe¢ cients relative to parent banks in
subsidiaries￿regressions are signi￿cant, a percentage much higher than the average for
EEBs and this result seems to suggest that the banking group linkages may have played
27Our ￿ndings are broadly consistent with those of ￿ CihÆk and Ong (2007), who analyse contagion in a
sample of 33 (mostly Western) European major banks between May 2000 and April 2007. The authors
￿nd signi￿cant spillovers in about 11 per cent of all possible links among the banks in their sample.
28Table 7 summarizes the results on the statistical signi￿cance of control variables (percentage of sig-
ni￿cant coe¢ cients). Local market shocks show the highest proportion of signi￿cant coe¢ cients for both
EEB and SWG groups. The signi￿cance of global funding conditions strongly increased in the crisis pe-
riod, especially for OWGs. However, as global banks￿performance and strategies in￿ uence global ￿nancial
conditions, the increase of signi￿cant common factors may re￿ ect an endogeneity problem (Pesaran and
Pick, 2007).
29This result may re￿ ect the fact that the crisis started primarily as a leap in systemic risk in the banking
systems of advanced economies, and among the largest banking groups idiosyncratic shocks were blurred by
the markets￿perception of an overall deterioration of banking system conditions, over and above direct and
bilateral links, as shown also by the increased signi￿cance of global funding conditions as an explanatory
variable (Table 7, column 2). The same reasoning may be applied to the low increase in cross-contagion
among SWGs and OWGs.
14a role in the transmission of contagion to Eastern European banking systems during the
recent ￿nancial crisis. However, the weight of this channel should not be overstated, as
signi￿cant coe¢ cients relative to parent-subsidiary linkages represent no more than 9% of
all signi￿cant coe¢ cients in the subset of contagion e⁄ects from SWGs to EEBs. More
importantly, as shown in Table 9, the result that contagion from SWGs to EEBs increased
during the recent crisis is only weakly a⁄ected by the presence of parent-subsidiary linkages
and stands up even excluding from the regressions all coe¢ cients related to group linkages.
Indeed, even though the percentage of signi￿cant positive coe¢ cients in the crisis period
drop to 20.2%, the di⁄erence between the two periods is still signi￿cant at the 5% level.
Finally, the increase of co-exceedances within EEBs shows evidence of regional con-
tagion. This e⁄ect and contagion coming from SWGs may support a common lender
explanation.30
Our results come with some caveats. As we use lagged bank idiosyncratic shocks in
order to avoid a likely positive simultaneity bias, we may miss those cases of contagion
taking place within one day. Some banks in our sample may play a signi￿cant role in
interbank markets or in global or local stock markets, suggesting that some common
shock variables, such as conditional volatility, may in fact capture e⁄ects that are related
to contagion. Our approach is rather conservative, as regards the testing procedure as well
as the de￿nition of co-exceedances, based on ￿ltered data, which may reduce the power of
regressions to identify contagion.31
5.1 Testing for emerging market contagion
In order to gain further insight into the transmission of shocks among Eastern and West-
ern European banking systems, in this section we perform a counterfactual experiment,
replacing the sample of EEBs by an equal number of emerging market banks, taken as
a control group, all from South America. Our goal is to test the hypothesis that, with
respect to contagion from and to EEBs, our results re￿ ect speci￿c e⁄ects, associated to
existing linkages with Western European banks, and do not re￿ ect a broader contagion
to and from emerging markets. In order to run our experiment, we select 15 large Latin
American banks (LABs), 4 of which belong to two European banking groups included in
our sample (Table 10).
Results are displayed in Table 11, while in Table 12 we carry out a test for the signi￿-
cance of the di⁄erences in contagion risks between the baseline model and the model with
LABs. Two results are worth noticing. In the crisis period contagion from SWGs to EEBs
is signi￿cantly higher than contagion to LABs. This, together with the circumstance that
estimates of contagion among SWGs are not statistically di⁄erent from the baseline, can
be seen as evidence of the robustness of our results regarding specialized Western groups.
By contrast, contagion from EEBs to SWGs is higher than contagion from LABs to SWGs,
but not signi￿cantly di⁄erent.
Overall, these two latter results suggest that while during the crisis regional special-
isation of some European banks resulted in a higher level of contagion to EE banking
systems, there is much weaker evidence that contagion from EEBs to Western European
groups was any di⁄erent than contagion from other emerging markets.32
30The role of specialization also emerges by comparing contagion to EEBs from the two subsets of
Western European banks. Contagion to EEBs from OWGs is signi￿cantly lower than contagion from
SWGs (the di⁄erence between the two e⁄ects is of 9 percentage points, signi￿cant at a 10% level).
31See Dungey et al. (2005b).
32A high level of contagion between two areas apparently with limited economic and ￿nancial linkages
can occur through cross-market rebalancing: global investors respond to a shock to a market by readjusting
156 Conclusions
In this paper we use a stock market-based indicator, the distance to default, to highlight
contagion risks in Western and Eastern European banking sectors. In the spirit of "extreme
value theory", we identify wide variations in this measure as depicting major shocks in
banks￿￿nancial conditions. Contagion occurs when the incidence of such tail events is
associated with similar shocks hitting other banks in the previous period, after controlling
for common factors. We distinguish between the period before and after the crisis, because,
due to information problems, contagion risk may have increased signi￿cantly in the latter
period. Improving on the literature, we introduce a testing procedure to measure changes
in contagion e⁄ects across di⁄erent groups of banks and over time.
We ￿nd that before the recent ￿nancial crisis, contagion was generally limited to the
largest Western European banking groups, while contagion from Western to Eastern Eu-
rope, and the reverse, was relatively less likely. The crisis has not only heightened the
risks of cross-border contagion but also modi￿ed their patterns. Contagion among Western
European banks with the highest market share in EE and from these groups to Eastern
European banks shows the largest increase in our sample. We also ￿nd evidence of con-
tagion spreading from Eastern European banks to their Western European counterparts,
but this result is much weaker, possibly re￿ ecting the presence of a broader phenomenon
of contagion from emerging markets sources.
Our ￿ndings suggests that after global ￿nancial conditions changed in 2007, uncertainty
about the risk stemming from operating in EE has increased market participants￿concerns
about banks￿shock-absorption capacities and has contributed to deeper stress in Western
European banks with a strong market presence in EE as well as Eastern European banks.
This is not surprising, because since the onset of the crisis, ￿nancial analysts have singled
out EE as one of the riskiest regions among emerging market economies, less able to stand
a sudden deterioration of global ￿nancial conditions.
The methodology used in this paper does not allow us to explore the exact nature of
the underlying transmission channels of contagion. On the other hand, as our measure of
contagion re￿ ects risks perceived by equity holders, its main advantage is to encompass all
possible channels of transmission, without relying on accurately measuring any particular
one. Nevertheless, some conclusions can be drawn about which channels were more likely
than others during the crisis. For example, banking group linkages might have played
a role in the transmissions of shocks to EE, even though this was not the only channel
(and not even the major one) at work in contagion from SWGs to EEBs. Regarding
contagion among SWGs, and from SWGs to EEBs, a reaction of equity holders mimicking
a run by depositors has probably been an important channel of propagation of contagion,
as shocks seem to have propagated due to asymmetric information, with negative news
about one bank triggering widespread sell-o⁄s in stocks of other banks sharing similar
business strategies.
their portfolio in another market. Due to asymmetric information problems, this e⁄ect is more intense
during crises (see Krodes and Pritsker, 2002).
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Figure 1 Western Bank Groups￿Exposure to Emerging Europe

























2007 2008 % of risk-weighted assets 2008
Source: company data.
Notes:
(1) Central Europe, South-Eastern Europe, Russia and other CIS. Net interest income instead of operating
income.
(2) Banking RWA in CEER business line as a percentage of total risk-weighted banking assets.
(3) RWA of subsidiaries in Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania, Russia and Serbia. On-balance
sheet commitments in Eastern Europe for 2007.
(4) International subsidiaries bank division. Loans to customers instead of RWA.
(5) Poland and CEE Divisions.
(6) Underlying income for retail banking operations in Central Europe to total underlying income in retail
banking.
(7) Baltic countries. On and o⁄ balance sheet credit exposure instead of RWA.
(8) Baltic and international banking operations.Total assets instead of RWA. External income instead of
operating income.
23Table 3 Sample of Eastern European banks
Bank Country Western European Total Assets in 2008
Parent Group (million euros)
Eastern European banks (EEB)
SBERBANK Russia 164,753
Bank Pekao Poland UniCredit 32,010
OTP Bank Hungary 35,866
Komercni Banka Czech Republic SociØtØ GØnØrale 25,964
BRE Bank Poland Commerzbank 20,041
ING Bank Slaski Poland ING Group 16,888
Zagrebacka Banka Croatia UniCredit 14,501
Bank Handlowy Warszawie Poland Citigroup 10,323
Privredna Banka Zagreb Croatia Intesa Sanpaolo 9,927
Bank Millennium Poland Millenium BCP 11,428
Vseobecna Uverova Banka Slovakia Intesa Sanpaolo 11,370
AB DnB NORD Bankas Lithuania DnB NOR 4,092
Bankas Snoras Lithuania 2,478
Central Cooperative Bank Bulgaria 862
BRD Romania SociØtØ GØnØrale 12,910
Source: Bankscope
24Table 4 Sample of Western European groups
Bank Country Total Assets in 2008
(million euros)
Specialised Western European groups (SWG)
ING Group Netherlands 1,034,689
KBC Group Belgium 318,550
SociØtØ GØnØrale France 1,130,003
UniCredit Italy 1,045,612
Intesa Sanpaolo Italy 636,133
Commerzbank Germany 625,196
Erste Group Bank Austria 201,441
Swedbank Sweden 166,670
Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken Sweden 230,976
Other Western European groups (OWG)
BNP Paribas France 2,075,551
Credit Agricole France 857,471
Deutsche Bank Germany 2,202,423
Barclays United Kingdom 2,150,537
Royal Bank of Scotland United Kingdom 1,967,122
Banco Santander Spain 1,049,632
BBV Argentaria Spain 542,650
Lloyds Banking Group United Kingdom 456,742
HSBC United Kingdom 968,127
Source: Bankscope
25Figure 2 Distribution of changes in distance to default
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Source: authors￿calculations.
Notes:
Distribution of stacked data on 33 banks￿changes in the distance to default.
Observations are 39,435 in the ￿rst period and 14,355 in the second period. 15th percentile left tail is -0.009 in the
period January 2003 to July 2007 and -0.036 in the period August 2007 to March 2009
26Figure 3 Exceedances
(number of banks out of 33 in the negative tail)
















































27Table 5a Shock transition probabilities in the absence of shock in t ￿ 1
(as a percentage of all possible outcomes)
(January 2003 - July 2007) (August 2007 - March 2009)
SWG OWG EEB All
banks
SWG OWG EEB All
banks
SWG 2.8 4.6 17.5 10.0 1.3 4.1 3.5 3.0
OWG 5.6 1.6 16.7 9.6 15.5 13.7 7.9 11.5
EEB 8:1 6.4 3.9 5.7 5.4 8.9 1.2 4.5
Note: cell ij in the table shows the probability of observing at least one shock
to a bank in group j at time t, given that no shock occurred in the bank group
i at time t-1.
Table 5b Shock transition probabilities given a shock in t ￿ 1
(as a percentage of all possible outcomes)
(January 2003-July 2007) (August 2007-March 2009)
SWG OWG EEB All
banks
SWG OWG EEB All
banks
SWG 23.1 19.6 18.8 20.2 39.5 39.8 18.9 30.2
OWG 23.3 26.7 20.1 22.7 29.9 30.6 14.6 23.2
EEB 13.4 12.6 19.6 16.0 29.9 30.0 18.6 24.8
Note: cell ij in the table shows the probability of observing at least one shock
to a bank in group j at time t, given that at least one shock occurred in the
bank group i at time t-1.
28Table 6 Signi￿cant co-exceedances, baseline model
(as a percentage of all possible links)
(January 2003-July 2007) (August 2007-March 2009)
Contagion to: Contagion to:
SWG OWG EEB All
banks
SWG OWG EEB All
banks
Initial shock to:
SWG 6.9 14.8 8.9 10.1 26.4 23.5 26.7 25.7
OWG 8.6 20.8 6.7 10.8 17.3 11.4 17.9 16.1
EEB 5.9 10.4 10.0 9.0 20.5 19.1 22.5 21.0
All banks 6.9 14.2 8.8 9.8 21.1 18.4 22.4 20.9
Note: only positive signi￿cant coe¢ cients (up to 5% in a one-side t-test) are
included. Standard errors are Huber/White robust.
Table 7 Control variables
(percentage of signi￿cant coe¢ cients )
(January 2003 - July 2007) (August 2007 - March 2009)
SWG OWG EEB All
banks
SWG OWG EEB All
banks
Variable
Global market shocks 11.1 22.2 13.3 15.2 11.1 12.5 27.3 17.9
Local market shocks 66.7 11.1 46.7 42.4 33.3 33.3 46.2 38.7
Investor risk appetite 0.0 44.4 6.7 15.2 0.0 44.4 0.0 12.5
Global funding conditions 0.0 0.0 13.3 6.1 11.1 75.0 7.1 25.8
Note: signi￿cant coe¢ cients up to 10% are included.
29Table 8 Change in signi￿cant co-exceedances
(August 2007 - March 2009 to January 2003 - July 2007 )
(percentage points)
Contagion to:
SWG OWG EEB All banks
Initial shock to:
SWG 19.4*** 8.6 17.8*** 15.6***
(6.0) (6.1) (4.6) (3.1)
OWG 8.6* -9.4 12.7*** 6.1*
(5.1) (6.1) (3.9) (2.8)
EEB 14.5*** 8.7** 12.5*** 12.0***
(4.1) (4.3) (3.6) (2.3)
All banks 14.1*** 4.2 13.6*** 11.2***
(2.8) (3.1) (2.3) (1.6)
Note: standard errors in parentheses; *, **,*** denote statistical signi￿cance
at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
30Table 9 Signi￿cant co-exceedances: no banking group linkages
(as a percentage of all possible links)
(January 2003-July 2007) (August 2007-March 2009)
Contagion to: Contagion to:
SWG OWG EEB All
banks
SWG OWG EEB All
banks
Initial shock to:
SWG 6.9 14.8 10.2 10.7 26.4 23.5 20.2 22.7
OWG 8.6 20.8 6.7 10.8 17.3 11.4 17.2 15.8
EEB 5.5 10.4 10.0 8.9 21.6 19.2 19.6 20.0
All banks 6.8 14.2 9.1 9.9 21.6 18.5 19.0 19.6
Notes:
Coe¢ cients relative to parent-subsidiary linkages are excluded from regressions.
Only positive signi￿cant coe¢ cients (up to 5% in a one-side t-test) are included.
Standard errors are Huber/White robust.
31Table 10 Sample of Latin American banks
Bank Country Western European Total Assets in 2008
Parent Group (million euros)
Latin American banks (LAB)
Itau Unibanco Holdings Brazil 183,675
Banco do Brasil Brazil 160,329
Banco Santander Chile Chile Banco Santander 24,142
Banco de Chile Chile 20,706
Banco de Credito e Inversiones Chile 15,404
Banco de Credito del Peru Peru 12,701
Banco Inbursa Mexico 11,127
Mercantil Banco Universal Venezuela 10,112
Banco Provincial Venezuela BBVA 9,498
BBVA Banco Continental Peru BBVA 7,654
BBVA Banco Frances Argentina BBVA 5,405
Banco Santander Rio Argentina Banco Santander 5,141
Banco de Galicia y Buenos Aires Argentina 5,115
Banco Macro Argentina 4,694
Banco Mercantil do Brasil Brazil 2,081
Source: Bankscope.
32Table 11 Signi￿cant co-exceedances: Latin American banks
(as a percentage of all possible links)
(January 2003-July 2007) (August 2007-March 2009)
Contagion to: Contagion to:
SWG OWG LAB SWG OWG LAB
Initial shock to:
SWG 15.3 16.0 4.4 22.2 14.8 14.7
OWG 12.3 19.4 7.4 9.9 12.5 20.5
LAB 5.9 3.0 10.0 14.5 13.0 32.4
Note: only positive signi￿cant coe¢ cients (up to 5% in a one-side t-test) are
included. Standard errors are Huber/White robust.
Table 12 Change in signi￿cant co-exceedances
(Baseline to Latin American banks)
(percentage points)
(January 2003-July 2007) (August 2007-March 2009)
Contagion to: Contagion to:
SWG OWG EEB to
LAB
SWG OWG EEB to
LAB
Initial shock to:
SWG -8.3 -1.2 4.4 4.2 8.6 12.1**
(5.2) (5.7) (3.0) (7.1) (6.1) (5.1)
OWG -3.7 1.4 -0.7 7.4 -1.1 -2.6
(4.8) (6.7) (3.1) (5.4) (5.4) (5.1)
EEB to LAB 0.0 7.4** 0.0 5.9 6.1 -9.9*
(2.9) (3.0) (2.9) (4.8) (4.7) (5.4)
Note: standard errors in parentheses; *, **,*** denote statistical signi￿cance
at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
33Table 13 Signi￿cant co-exceedances: large negative shock as the 10th percentile
(as a percentage of all possible links)
(January 2003-July 2007) (August 2007-March 2009)
Contagion to: Contagion to:
SWG OWG EEB All
banks
SWG OWG EEB All
banks
Initial shock to:
SWG 15.3 19.8 9.7 13.9 22.2 14.8 29.4 23.3
OWG 18.5 20.8 7.4 10.8 20.0 21.7 25.2 22.9
EEB 9.7 11.1 10.0 10.2 21.4 23.1 35.7 27.9
All banks 13.6 16.0 9.2 12.2 21.2 20.2 30.8 25.2
Note: only positive signi￿cant coe¢ cients (up to 5% in a one-side t-test) are
included. Standard errors are Huber/White robust.
Table 14 Change in signi￿cant co-exceedances
(Baseline to large negative shock as the 10th percentile)
(percentage points)
(January 2003-July 2007) (August 2007- March 2009)
Contagion to: Contagion to:
SWG OWG EEB SWG OWG EEB
Initial shock to:
SWG -8.3 -4.9 -0.8 4.2 8.6 -2.6
(5.2) (5.9) (3.5) (7.1) (6.1) (5.5)
OWG -9.9* 0.0 -0.7 -2.7 -10.3* -7.3
(5.3) (6.8) (3.1) (6.1) (6.3) (5.1)
EEB -3.8 0.7 0.0 -0.9 -4.0 -13.2***
(3.3) (3.8) (2.9) (5.0) (5.2) (4.6)
Note: standard errors in parentheses; *, **,*** denote statistical signi￿cance
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